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During a recent medical malpractice lawsuit brought against me, I was forced to confront the
fundamentally different ways in which physician scientists and litigation attorneys assess and
utilize clinical evidence. The plaintiff alleged that I failed to diagnose myocardial sarcoid in
her husband and that my failure to do so resulted in her husband’s death. Her case was based
largely on the testimony of one expert witness, who had been involved in more than 300 other
medical malpractice actions, and who had never performed any kind of peer-reviewed
research or systematic reviews on myocardial sarcoid. None of the evidence that he presented
against me was based on randomized trials, high-quality observational studies or even
published practice guidelines, yet the judge saw fit to introduce his testimony as valid evidence
to be considered by a lay jury. I conclude by proposing a voluntary system whereby expert
witnesses would subject their reports to external peer review, much as is done at top-tier
medical journals. Those experts who are able to have their reports pass peer review would be
presented to the jury as having a greater level of credibility. (J Am Coll Cardiol 2002;40:
563–4) © 2002 by the American College of Cardiology Foundation
Three hours ago my trial almost ended. I say “almost”
because the verdict is not yet in. The lawyers completed
their closing statements and the judge gave the jurors her
charge. She spoke to them about “evidence” and “credibil-
ity,” two terms that as a clinician, clinical scientist and editor
of a major medical journal mean much to me.
Nine years ago I admitted a 41-year-old man with
symptomatic high-grade heart block. Except for cannon
A-waves his physical examination was unremarkable. A
chest X-ray and multiple blood tests were normal. I put
together a long differential diagnosis that, fortunately, I took
the trouble to write into the chart. One of the many entities
I entered was “sarcoid.”
An echocardiogram showed normal biventricular size and
function along with mild left atrial enlargement and mildly
increased tricuspid valve regurgitation velocity. I consulted
an electrophysiologist who felt that premature degenerative
conduction system disease was present. A pacemaker was
inserted.
After his discharge, I transferred his care to my electro-
physiologist colleague. I heard nothing more until three
years later, when a lawyer wrote me that the patient had
died suddenly. An autopsy found disseminated sarcoidosis.
My colleague and I were sued for failure to make the
diagnosis of cardiac sarcoidosis.
The case against us hinged on the testimony of one expert
witness, a cardiologist who has been involved in more than
300 medical malpractice suits. He admitted to having never
published a paper about cardiac sarcoidosis. He stated that
we failed to appropriately manage this patient and argued
that had we made the diagnosis we would have started
steroids and prevented his sudden death.
In order to recover damage for medical malpractice, a
plaintiff must show that a physician deviated from accepted
standards of care, and that that deviation resulted in
damages. Here, the issue was whether the patient’s ultimate
sudden death could have been prevented had a diagnosis of
myocardial sarcoidosis been made. Looking at this question
with the mindset of a scientist and journal editor, there was
no claim. There has never been a randomized trial of any
kind of treatment for prevention of mortality due to myo-
cardial sarcoidosis. This did come out during the trial, but
only briefly.
When the testimony ended, the judge instructed the
jurors to base their decision solely on evidence presented in
court. They could decide that some of what a witness said
was believable and that some was not. They could assess the
credibility of a witness not just by what was said, but how it
was said. Based on the credibility of the evidence, they were
to decide whether or not we breached accepted standards of
care and whether or not that breach resulted in damages.
My language of evidence include such terms as statistical
power; corrections for multiple comparisons; appropriate-
ness of assumptions of normality, proportional hazards and
linearity; considerations of the effects of outliers; assessment
of confounding and effect modification; and criteria for
causality. These are terms of evidence that are widely
accepted within the academic medical community and that
are used by professional societies to develop practice guide-
lines.
My language of credible evidence does not include
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“expert” witnesses. I long ago abandoned the idea that a
certain viewpoint must be correct simply because a respected
professor says so. Does that mean there is no role for
experts? Of course not! But experts are people who are active
in ongoing research and who use our language of credible
evidence to reach their conclusions, conclusions based on
honest, peer-reviewed assessment of scientific data.
Some have suggested that expert testimony not based on
peer review is a major reason why there is a major disconnect
between clinical and courtroom science (1). Others have
recommended that expert witnesses submit transcripts of
depositions for formal peer review (2). I never thought
much about this until I was sued and confronted with a
totally alien kind of evidence that was to be evaluated by lay
jurors. Our defense attorney stood before the jury and told
them that “I believe in the jury system.” Well, I as a clinical
scientist and medical editor wish to state here that I believe
in the peer-review system.
I am well aware of the many problems with the medical
malpractice system, about which much has been written
(3,4). Using high-quality standards of clinical science evi-
dence, the malpractice system has been shown to do a poor
job of identifying negligence, of providing compensation for
victims of medical injury and of deterring poor-quality care
(5–7). I am not going to be yet another malpractice victim
proposing sweeping changes.
But I do have one small suggestion. I would like to see a
voluntary system whereby expert witnesses would have the
opportunity to submit their pretrial reports for peer review.
Peer reviewers would be chosen by professional societies (8)
and would be compensated for their time by the involved
law firms. As is the case with scientific publication, the
peer-review process would be anonymous and confidential.
Expert reports could be rejected as being highly unlikely to
present correct conclusions or conditionally accepted based
on adequate revision and answers to reviewers’ queries.
Attorneys would have the right to enter an expert’s report
into evidence whether or not it was submitted for peer
review and what the results of that review were. Judges
would be expected to explain to juries what peer review
means and that expert reports that have cleared the rigors of
peer review should be considered as having a higher degree
of credibility.
I am now about to fly home after more than a week away.
I can hardly wait to see my wife and children again and to
return to the daily grind. Tomorrow I will likely find out the
jury’s verdict.
POSTSCRIPT
My lawyer just called. After nine hours of deliberations the
jury found that my electrophysiologist colleague and I were
not negligent in our treatment of the deceased patient. They
awarded no damages.
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